By Cass R. Sunstein and Reid Hastie
In
sports, some people are famous for “making other players better.” Magic
Johnson, the great basketball player and winner of five National
Basketball Association (NBA) championships, was not merely a terrific
scorer, passer, and rebounder; he also transformed his teammates—some of
them ordinary players—into stars. Early in his career, Michael Jordan
was known to be great, maybe even the greatest of the great, but his
teams just didn’t win. People wondered whether he could ever win a
championship, because he “wasn’t a team player.”
In business, some
people are thought to be like the young Michael Jordan—individual
superstars who, apart from their own skills, don’t add much to team
efforts. But there are others, like Magic Johnson, who are widely
thought to make others better. Is it possible to say something about
what kind of person does that? Not something impressionistic, intuitive,
and anecdotal, but something that is actually based on evidence?
Intriguing answers are starting to emerge, and they involve something
called Factor C.
Team Players
Social
scientists have uncovered a statistical factor that reflects how people
do on a large number of cognitive tasks; this factor is sometimes
referred to as general intelligence. An obvious conclusion is that
groups should seek people who have something like general intelligence.
Indeed, that seems to be true. With respect to various measures of
cognitive ability, there is a consistent finding across studies of many
different small groups: groups with a higher average IQ tend to perform
better.
Interestingly,
studies of actual work groups find a somewhat looser relationship than
do studies of laboratory groups. But the evidence unequivocally shows
that groups with smarter members perform at higher levels. This is not
exactly a remarkable observation. But it is a good point to keep in mind
when you’re putting together a group of people.
There’s an
important qualification to this finding, and to identify it, we have to
return to basketball. In 2010, the Miami Heat basketball team created a
kind of dream team, with three genuine superstars: LeBron James, Dwayne
Wade, and Chris Bosh. James and Wade rank among the best basketball
players of all time, and Bosh has been an All-Star. When the team was
initially assembled, Sunstein had the good fortune to meet the Boston
Celtics’ Hall-of-Famer Bill Russell, who is the greatest winner, and the
greatest team player, in the history of professional sports. In his
thirteen years in the NBA, Russell won the championship eleven times—an
astounding championship rate of 85 percent. By the way, Russell was an
anxious leader. He was famous for vomiting before big games, and when he
was in the bathroom (vomiting), his teammates knew that they could
expect to win.
Excited and a bit terrified (what can one say to
Bill Russell?), Sunstein asked Russell whether the Miami Heat would win
the championship that year. Sunstein was confident that Russell would
say yes; who could possibly beat a team with James, Wade, and Bosh?
Instead Russell offered a definite “No!” When asked for an explanation,
Russell gave a quiet but firm response: “One ball.” And in fact, the
Heat lost in the finals that year to the Dallas Mavericks, a far less
skilled team—but a team.
Which brings us back to Michael Jordan.
By the time he retired, Jordan had become one of the greatest all-time
winners, besting Johnson (but not Russell) with six championships to his
credit. What happened?
Here’s
a clue. Late in Game 5 of the 1991 NBA Finals at the Forum in Los
Angeles, the Chicago Bulls were ahead 3 to 1 in the series, and they
were clinging to a fragile lead. Though double-teamed, Jordan was still
shooting a lot—and missing. During a crucial timeout, Phil Jackson, the
Bulls’ coach, looked Jordan right in the eyes and said, “Michael, who’s
open?” Michael didn’t answer. Jackson asked again. “Michael, who’s
open?” Jordan responded: “Pax.”
“Pax” was John Paxson, an
unheralded guard who was a deadly shooter, at least when no one was
covering him. Jordan got the ball to Paxson, who nailed a series of open
shots. The Bulls claimed the first of their NBA championships. And by
the way, the Miami Heat eventually became a team as well, winning two
championships after its initial defeat, arguably because of improved
teamwork.
Enough basketball. We have referred to Nancy-Ann DeParle
and Jeff Zients, the anxious leaders in the Obama administration.
They’re very different, but they know there’s just one ball, and they
know who’s open. Although they’re worriers, they don’t just admire
problems; they see around the bend and hunt for solutions. DeParle and
Zients know the importance of assembling teams, not simply on the basis
of skill, but also on the basis of teamwork and the capacity to add what
the group most needs.
Good players mesh. This observation may be a
cliché, but it’s nevertheless important to keep in mind:
personalities—not merely abilities—matter. In this regard, most people’s
intuition, at least in Western cultures, would lead us to two
conclusions. First, some personality types are far better than others
(Bill Russell and Magic Johnson, as opposed to the early Michael
Jordan). Second, successful groups have a good mixture of personality
types.
Those observations are not exactly wrong, but they do not
take us very far toward specifying the right mixture of personality
types for a particular task. What kinds of personalities would be best
able to figure out an investment strategy for next year? To decide how
to market a cell phone? To conduct a negotiation to acquire a company?
To invent a new pharmaceutical drug or execute an emergency evacuation?
To figure out how to get a start-up off the ground? To plan a litigation
strategy for a copyright case?
A Popular, Bad Answer
To
answer such questions, by far the most popular choice in American
companies has been the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, a test that
separates individuals into sixteen basic “types” based on their
self-reports of life preferences. A lot of companies take the test
seriously.
Before we explain why pigeonholing people into
personality types is not a good idea in business, let’s look at the
general disadvantages of using personality assessments to predict
behavior. Unlike members of more collectivist cultures (think Asia),
Westerners seem obsessed with people’s personality traits as a means of
understanding and predicting future conduct. If we want to know what
employee Smith will do under conditions of time pressure, we tend to ask
ourselves, What kind of person is Smith? That isn’t a crazy question,
but in practice, even the most valid personality tests have only modest
predictive power. Nonetheless, many people quite confidently rely on
impressions of personality to explain the actions of their friends and
colleagues. Their confidence is often misplaced.
The problem is
that we exaggerate how consistent people are across both situations and
time. If someone is lazy around the house, we might conclude that he is
also likely to be lazy at work or in the gym. If someone was easily
distracted in class, he will also be easily distracted at work. But in
many cases, this kind of cross-situational behavioral consistency does
not exist. Most of us are a lot less consistent in how we behave in
different situations than we think we are. This goes in spades for our
beliefs about the consistency of other people. Relying on these mostly
false beliefs about behavioral consistency and hence predictability, we
are overconfident about how accurately we understand and can predict
others.
Social psychologists call this tendency to rely
excessively on personality descriptors, and to be overconfident in our
capacities to predict behavior, the fundamental attribution error.
Attribution refers to everyday explanations that claim that other
people’s behavior is a product of a trait (e.g., extroversion, laziness)
possessed by the actor. If even weakly valid traits, like extroversion
and conscientiousness, have low predictive value, an unscientific trait
categorization like the Myers-Briggs score is going to be totally
useless for purposes of prediction or for designing a team or another
collective.
Consider, for example, this question from the
Myers-Briggs test: “Would you rather work under a boss (a) who is
good-natured, but often inconsistent or (b) who is sharp-tongued, but
always logical?” Your answer to this question is aimed to assign you to a
“feeling” or a “thinking” category. Or consider this question: “Is it
true (a) that facts ‘speak for themselves’ or (b) that facts ‘illustrate
principles’?” Your answer indicates whether you belong in the
“perception” or “judging” category. Or this: “Are you the kind of person
(a) who is external and communicative and likes to express yourself or
(b) who is internal and reticent and keeps to yourself?” Your answer
types you as extroverted or introverted. The sixteen Myers-Briggs types
are defined by four dimensions: extroversion-introversion,
sensing-intuition, thinking-feeling, and judging-perception.
Careful studies have shown the Myers-Briggs test does not accurately predict behavior. (Photo: GordSpence/Flickr, used under a Creative Commons license)
By
some reports, almost 90 percent of the major US companies use the
Myers-Briggs test for employee selection, placement, or counseling. But
careful studies show that the test does not predict behavior of any kind
with much validity. One problem is that the test has what statisticians
call low test-retest reliability. If you retake the test after a
one-month gap, there’s a 50 percent chance that you will fall into a
different personality category from your original category. With such
low reliability, the test is unlikely to have much predictive validity
in companies that are deciding whether to assign an employee to a team
for a three-month project.
One group of researchers, for example,
studied the actual value of the Myers-Briggs test in teamwork
applications and concluded that it “does not account for behavioral
differences nor does it exactly clarify which characteristics of a
particular function an individual may exhibit.” More generally, careful
scientific reviews, including statistical meta-analyses, find little
value in personality test scores, including scales that are more valid
predictors of behavior than the Myers-Briggs. It follows that the
Myers-Briggs is not likely to provide guidance for managers trying to
staff a team to perform a novel task.
At the same time, and the
weakness of the Myers-Briggs notwithstanding, team performance does seem
to depend on whether people are sociable in the relevant sense (a point
for Bill Russell). More technically, research suggests that measures of
preferences for social working conditions have provided fruitful clues
for a successful team. Groups composed of people who prefer to work in
teams do end up working better. While the relationship between social
preference and work success appears to be modest, it is real, and wise
groups take it into account.
An Intriguing Finding
We
need a lot more work on whether certain types are helpful to groups.
But one especially thought-provoking development in recent research has
been reported in studies from a group associated with the Center for
Collective Intelligence at MIT. These researchers wondered if there
could be some general method to assess the problem-solving capacity of a
team across many types of intellectual and social problems. They
conducted two large-scale tests of two- to five-member groups, solving
problems such as brainstorming, answering IQ test questions, solving
moral dilemmas, and even playing checkers.
Their central finding
is that three individual-member measures combined into a useful measure
of collective IQ, which the researchers called Factor C. First, the
average of the members’ scores on a test of social perception (the
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test) predicted performance: the higher the
average, the higher the group’s performance. This test was originally
invented by the psychologist Simon Baron-Cohen (brother of the actor and
comic Sacha Baron-Cohen) to diagnose autism in children. The person
taking the test is shown a series of photos of just the eyes of another
person and asked to judge what emotion the person in the photo is
experiencing (e.g., playful, irritated, bored).
Psychologist Simon Baron-Cohen, creator of a test of social perception. (Photo:Andy Miah/Flickr, used under a Creative Commons license.)
The
second measure, unevenness of participation, or the tendency of a few
members to dominate a discussion, was negatively related to group
performance. Intriguingly, the third measure, the number of women on the
team, positively predicted performance.
Perhaps the most striking
conclusion is that the Factor C measure predicted team performance
better than conventional measures of intelligence did. (Compare the 2010
Dallas Mavericks, consisting of team players, to the star-studded 2010
Miami Heat.) Average IQ and highest IQ were not correlated with team
performance nearly as highly as Factor C. More technically, IQ measures
were correlated in the +.10 to +.20 range; Factor C was correlated at
the high level of +.50 (+1.00 is the highest possible correlation).
The
other noteworthy result was the simple, direct relationship between the
percentage of women members and performance. This correlation was not
simply a diversity factor; rather, the more women, the better the
performance. Other research supports this basic finding. But we should
be pretty careful here, because the finding may be explained by the
observation that women are also consistently better than men at a
variety of social perception and social judgment tests (like the Reading
the Mind in the Eyes Test used in these studies).
With respect to
Factor C, Nancy-Ann DeParle and Jeff Zients are superstars. DeParle can
size up a room, and a person, in an instant. She can take its emotional
temperature, see behind the happy talk, and supply exactly what’s
needed. And within Sunstein’s first month at the White House, a (female)
friend of his said, with a combination of incredulity and admiration,
that Jeff Zients “has the most emotional intelligence of any man I’ve
ever met.” At the time, Zients was a newcomer to government, and he had a
ton to learn. But he had already mastered something very much like
Factor C.
To be sure, we should be careful to avoid extravagant
conclusions here. At this stage, it is difficult to identify exactly
what underlies the high correlation between Factor C and performance on
the problem-solving tasks. What seems to be the most important is the
capacity of the individual members to cooperate with one another and to
coordinate their performance. Unfortunately, it is always difficult to
define the true causal factor in correlations of this type.
Nonetheless,
the finding does suggest an important direction for research on whether
particular individuals are especially good (other things being equal)
at contributing to group performance.
Nancy-Ann DeParle and Jeff Zients, both "Factor C" superstars. (Photos: Getty Images)
Take
that possibility seriously and, by analogy with research on individual
performance, see if a general, quantifiable measure of Factor C can be
defined. Such a measure would be extremely valuable in allowing us to
design groups that are more effective. It would also stimulate further
research on the nature of the effective ingredient captured at least
partly by Factor C.
Beyond the institutional recommendations made
here, wise groups should devote real attention to social abilities,
including the capacities both to participate and to listen, in selecting
personnel and in devising social norms. A person’s preference to work
on teams, especially when the preference is linked to social skills, is a
good predictor—as is the ability to read other people’s emotional
states.
Face-to-Face versus Online
But
when, exactly, will Factor C really matter? Some groups have a lot of
members who operate independently. Some of these members have little
emotional intelligence, and in the usual respects, you wouldn’t consider
them team players. Maybe they’re a bit autistic. But they’re
sensational at their individual jobs, and the groups are a lot better
because of them. Most groups have members and even leaders like that.
(Steve Jobs was not exactly famous for his emotional intelligence.) Why
aren’t they a problem?
It is important to make a distinction that
cuts across many types of collectives (teams, committees, electronic
crowds, and so forth). Some team members act wholly or somewhat
independently to complete the task. Other team members have to
coordinate, perhaps even at the lowest levels of work, on that task. In
terms of evaluating the importance of personality, the difference
greatly matters.
Many tasks can be “crowdsourced,” in the sense
that individuals can work on their contributions independently until the
ultimate stage in the task requires integrating or selecting a
contribution. This is true in many forecasting tasks (“take an
average”), tournaments (everyone suggests his or her individual best
solutions and anyone can see which solution is the best), elections
(each voter seeks out some information, perhaps with social
deliberation, and then submits a vote or conclusion independently). In
other cases, ingenious aggregation devices (prediction markets)
integrate individual, independent solutions into a collective answer.
By
contrast, many collective endeavors require coordination from the
beginning to the end. The most obvious example is the classic
face-to-face, physically connected team that must combine interdependent
pieces and adjust them repeatedly to make them fit together into a
functioning whole. (By the way, there is a lot of interest these days in
the idea of telecommuting, which can make work a lot better for a lot
of people, especially if they have young children. And if coordination
is not required, telecommuting should be just fine. But when
face-to-face interaction is needed—and it often is—telecommuting comes
with a real cost. For overall productivity, the record of telecommuting
is mixed.)
Consider a team constructing a physical product—say, a
bridge, a ship, or an entrée. The members must interact frequently and
with quick, coordinated responses, or the product risks falling apart.
Many less tangible “products” also require more coordination and
real-time interaction. For example, the development of a litigating
position within a law firm may well require continuing discussions, and
if people are trying to create a new tablet or computer, it is probably
best if they work with one another.
What is remarkable about the
rise of electronic networks is how many tasks that seemed to require
face-to-face, real-time collaboration can be performed with much less
coordination over networks. The game-changing example is software
coding, which seemed to demand face-to-face teamwork until landmark
projects like the open-source operating system Linux were developed.
Before
1992, there were many efforts to create distributed software systems to
support the collaborative development of computer programs. Many
commercial programs were written online, with loosely synchronized team
processes. But in 1991, Linus Torvalds took this method to the next
level when he invited thousands of programmers to contribute to his
operating system and shifted the coordination to a late-stage selection
and editing process, instead of an early-stage guidance role. Obviously,
Wikipedia is another example of a new method of collaborating, where
identification occurs mostly in a wide-open, early stage and where
coordination and integration only occur very late in the process in a
selection and editing stage.
All this is to say that social skills
and an appetite for working on teams may not be essential in every kind
of successful collective, especially those that do not require a
face-to-face, real-time process. Extreme independence may even be a
plus. But if the team process requires coordination in early stages or
throughout the process, then Factor C and other aspects of sociability
will matter a great deal. There may be only one ball, but whether that’s
a problem depends on the nature of the task that the group is asked to
complete.
Cass
R. Sunstein, the former administrator of the White House Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, is the Robert Walmsley university
professor at Harvard Law School and a Bloomberg View columnist.
Reid Hastie
is the Ralph and Dorothy Keller Distinguished Service Professor of
Behavioral Science at the University of Chicago's Booth School of
Business.
Reprinted by permission of Harvard Business Review Press. Excerpted from Wiser: Getting Beyond Groupthink to Make Groups Smarter by Cass R. Sunstein and Reid Hastie. Copyright 2015. All rights reserved.